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The	  ambiguity	  and	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  of	  tolerance	  
	  Piet	  van	  der	  Ploeg,	  University	  of	  Groningen,	  NL	  
	  Short	  lecture	  at	  the	  AMCIS/LLAKES	  conference	  on	  Citizenship	  education	  at	  ÖREBRO	  UNIVERSITET	  in	  Sweden	  in	  June	  2016.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Citizenship	  education	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  subjects	  of	  our	  research	  in	  Ethics	  of	  Education	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Groningen.	  	  Deliberating	  on	  teaching	  tolerance	  can	  illustrate	  the	  practical	  relevance	  of	  what	  we	  do,	  although	  we	  are	  philosophers	  of	  education.	  	  I	  will	  discuss	  two	  characteristics	  of	  tolerance	  and	  consider	  the	  consequences	  for	  teaching	  tolerance.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Exploration	  of	  systematic	  and	  historical	  literature	  reveals	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	  four	  kinds	  of	  motivation	  for	  tolerance:	  	  1. Epistemic	  motivation:	  the	  insight	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ultimate	  truth.	  Or	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  single	  or	  superior	  access	  to	  the	  truth.	  This	  is	  the	  Socratic	  idea	  of	  tolerance.	  Tolerance	  is	  an	  important	  virtue	  because	  everyone’s	  serious	  pursuit	  of	  the	  truth	  is	  of	  equal	  worth.	  	  2. Strategic	  motivation:	  (a)	  tolerance	  to	  facilitate	  the	  oppression	  of	  others,	  repressive	  tolerance,	  or	  (b)	  to	  safeguard	  oneself	  from	  oppression	  by	  others,	  defensive	  tolerance,	  or	  (c)	  to	  secure	  the	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  living,	  
pluralistic	  tolerance.	  3. Moral	  motivation,	  for	  instance:	  tolerance	  as	  benevolence,	  respect,	  modesty,	  strength	  of	  character	  or	  patience	  (in	  the	  face	  of	  adversity	  or	  fate).	  	  	  Out	  of	  benevolence:	  wanting	  the	  best	  for	  the	  other;	  accepting	  him	  as	  he	  is.	  Out	  of	  respect:	  appreciating	  the	  other’s	  convictions.	  Out	  of	  modesty:	  the	  opposite	  of	  being	  stubborn	  and	  headstrong.	  Tolerance	  as	  strength	  of	  character:	  not	  allowing	  oneself	  to	  be	  carried	  away	  by	  emotions	  and	  impulses;	  exercising	  self-­‐control.	  As	  patience:	  reconciling	  oneself	  with	  what	  happens,	  with	  the	  circumstances,	  the	  conditions,	  the	  facts	  of	  living;	  accepting	  reality,	  even	  if	  it	  means	  suffering	  and	  involves	  injustice.	  	  4. Religious	  motivation:	  (a)	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  authentic	  faith	  is	  possible	  or	  desirable	  (that	  faith	  doesn’t	  fit	  with	  coercion)	  and	  (b)	  the	  belief	  that	  God	  is	  the	  sole	  judge	  of	  others’	  faith.	  	  This	  is	  the	  classic	  Christian	  idea	  of	  tolerance.	  (a)	  Faith	  can	  only	  be	  genuine	  or	  true	  if	  it	  is	  sincere,	  one’s	  own,	  personal,	  unforced.	  
And	  (b)	  only	  God	  can	  and	  may	  judge	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  person’s	  faith,	  for	  instance	  whether	  it	  is	  truly	  one’s	  own.	  Tolerance	  is	  the	  logical	  consequence.	  Four	  kinds	  of	  motivation.	  Each	  kind	  of	  motivation	  emphasises	  a	  different	  aspect	  or	  meaning	  of	  tolerance.	  	  The	  diversity	  of	  motivations	  makes	  tolerance	  a	  complicated	  educational	  goal.	  It	  raises	  the	  question	  which	  of	  the	  motivations	  we	  want	  our	  students	  to	  develop	  and	  how	  to	  choose	  and	  justify	  this	  specific	  direction.	  	  Or	  do	  we	  want	  the	  students	  to	  develop	  all	  the	  motivations?	  And	  if	  so:	  is	  that	  possible?	  Would	  it	  not	  be	  self-­‐contradictory,	  to	  develop	  all?	  And	  would	  it	  be	  sensible	  in	  the	  context	  of	  citizenship	  education?	  For	  example,	  how	  is	  tolerance	  as	  patience	  compatible	  with	  citizenship	  as	  active	  political	  concern	  and	  participation;	  impatience	  towards	  injustice?	  I	  have	  no	  answer.	  But	  I	  do	  have	  more	  questions.	  	  Interestingly,	  specific	  cases	  of	  tolerance	  may	  be	  prompted	  by	  various	  motivations.	  	  For	  example:	  many	  Muslim	  students	  in	  the	  NL	  expressly	  disapprove	  of	  homosexuality.	  As	  a	  teacher,	  I	  might	  reject	  their	  view,	  but	  tolerate	  it.	  I	  might	  tolerate	  it	  for	  different	  reasons,	  and	  for	  different	  reasons	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  Because	  I	  care	  about	  these	  students;	  things	  are	  hard	  enough	  for	  them	  nowadays.	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  blame	  or	  incriminate	  them.	  So,	  my	  tolerance	  is	  out	  of	  benevolence.	  	  And	  at	  the	  same	  time:	  because	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  antagonise	  them;	  to	  estrange	  them;	  it	  would	  impede,	  hinder	  their	  integration	  or	  assimilation.	  So,	  my	  tolerance	  towards	  their	  condemnation	  of	  homosexuality,	  is	  partly	  functional,	  repressive	  tolerance.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  my	  tolerance	  can	  be	  partly	  an	  outcome	  of	  my	  patience:	  I	  am	  at	  peace	  with	  the	  sad	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  many	  people	  with	  stupid	  and	  harmful	  opinions.	  	  And,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  can	  tolerate	  it,	  because	  I	  realise	  that	  my	  strong	  conviction	  -­‐-­‐the	  equal	  worthiness	  of	  sexual	  orientations-­‐-­‐	  is	  indeed	  a	  conviction,	  just	  a	  conviction.	  So,	  I	  also	  tolerate	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  students,	  partly,	  for	  epistemic	  reasons.	  	  But	  although	  I	  could	  have	  four	  and	  maybe	  more	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  to	  tolerate	  their	  disapproval	  of	  homosexuality,	  and	  could	  be	  ready	  to	  do	  so,	  to	  tolerate	  it,	  I	  still	  could	  have	  my	  doubts.	  Shouldn’t	  I	  be	  
intolerant	  towards	  their	  disapproval?	  For	  their	  disapproval	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  intolerance	  and	  it	  seems	  contradictory	  to	  tolerate	  intolerance.	  This	  is	  a	  core	  problem	  of	  tolerance:	  	  To	  what	  extent	  is	  it	  permissible	  or	  necessary	  to	  tolerate	  convictions	  or	  behavior	  that	  are,	  in	  themselves,	  intolerant?	  And	  what	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  teaching	  tolerance?	  	  This	  is	  not	  philosophical	  hairsplitting.	  Many	  Muslim	  and	  orthodox	  Protestant	  students	  disapprove	  of	  homosexuality.	  Some	  Dutch	  students	  make	  fun	  of	  the	  Ramadan.	  Some	  Muslim	  students	  play	  down	  or	  deny	  the	  Holocaust.	  It	  happens	  in	  our	  schools.	  And	  it	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  firm	  convictions.	  	  Should	  we	  teach	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  students	  learn	  to	  tolerate	  such	  intolerance	  from	  others	  or	  should	  we	  teach	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  learn	  to	  not	  tolerate	  such	  intolerance?	  In	  my	  opinion	  we	  should	  teach	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  students	  can	  learn	  how	  to	  decide	  such	  questions	  for	  themselves.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  job,	  this	  deciding.	  It	  can	  get	  rather	  complicated.	  	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  once	  a	  year	  we	  observe	  two	  minutes’	  silence	  to	  commemorate	  the	  victims	  of	  war.	  During	  this	  commemoration,	  we	  
often	  witness	  that	  young	  people	  ignore	  the	  two-­‐minutes’	  silence	  and	  indifferently	  carry	  on	  talking	  or	  listening	  to	  music	  or	  even	  making	  music,	  showing	  no	  respect	  or	  regard	  for	  others’	  deep	  sensitivities.	  I	  am	  sure	  we	  don’t	  have	  to	  tolerate	  this	  kind	  of	  intolerance.	  And	  I	  presume	  students	  can	  easily	  learn	  to	  come	  to	  this	  same	  conclusion.	  	  But	  what	  about	  the	  following	  case?	  In	  the	  week	  after	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  Paris	  last	  year,	  the	  victims	  were	  remembered	  with	  a	  minute’s	  silence,	  also	  in	  our	  schools.	  This	  commemoration	  was	  disturbed	  by	  a	  minority	  of	  students	  at	  many	  vocational	  secondary	  schools,	  not	  out	  of	  indifference,	  disrespect	  or	  unruliness,	  but	  as	  a	  form	  of	  protest.	  They	  thought	  it	  unfair	  to	  commemorate	  a	  hundred	  and	  thirty	  European	  victims	  of	  radical	  Muslim	  violence,	  while	  the	  numerous	  Muslim	  victims	  of	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  Middle-­‐East	  are	  never	  commemorated.	  These	  students	  were	  intolerant	  towards	  the	  commemorators	  by	  conviction.	  Should	  we,	  contrary	  to	  indifferent	  or	  unruly	  intolerance,	  do	  tolerate	  this	  kind	  of	  intolerance?	  Maybe.	  It	  can	  become	  even	  more	  complicated.	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  elsewhere,	  various	  groups,	  including	  students,	  protest	  against	  headscarves,	  that	  is,	  Muslim	  women,	  including	  students	  and	  teachers,	  wearing	  headscarves.	  I’m	  inclined	  to	  not	  tolerate	  this	  protest,	  not	  to	  be	  tolerant	  towards	  this	  intolerance	  towards	  Muslims.	  However,	  these	  protests	  against	  headscarves	  reveal	  political	  commitment	  and	  sometimes	  reveal	  a	  concern	  for	  women’s	  rights:	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  protests	  against	  intolerance	  towards	  women	  who	  would	  prefer	  to	  live	  without	  a	  headscarf.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  may	  or	  must	  be	  intolerant	  towards	  intolerance	  towards	  intolerance?	  I	  am	  not	  sure.	  But	  this	  does	  strengthen	  me	  in	  my	  opinion	  that	  we	  should	  teach	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  students	  learn	  how	  to	  discriminate	  between	  kinds	  or	  instances	  of	  intolerance:	  what	  kinds	  of	  intolerance	  are	  not	  to	  be	  tolerated	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  intolerance	  are;	  what	  instances	  of	  intolerance	  are	  not	  to	  be	  tolerated	  and	  what	  instances	  of	  intolerance	  are?	  
All	  these	  problems	  bring	  me	  to	  something	  else	  the	  literature	  shows,	  besides	  the	  diversity	  of	  motivations:	  that	  tolerance	  is	  more	  than	  self-­‐control	  and	  modesty.	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  emotional	  competence	  and	  disposition.	  It	  is	  also	  being	  able	  to	  judge	  when	  and	  when	  not	  tolerance	  is	  appropriate.	  Therefore,	  tolerance	  requires	  insight	  and	  knowledge.	  Tolerance	  has	  a	  knowledge	  dimension.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  strategically	  motivated	  tolerance,	  it	  is	  obvious.	  Tolerance	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  conflict	  and	  reduce	  	  discontentment,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  tolerance	  encourages	  conflict	  and	  discontentment.	  The	  constitutional	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  Every	  religious	  denomination	  is	  granted	  space.	  That	  ensures	  peaceful	  co-­‐existence.	  But	  it	  also	  creates	  a	  breeding	  ground	  for	  orthodoxy	  and	  radicalism,	  illiberalism	  and	  intolerance.	  Where	  is	  the	  critical	  threshold	  between	  enough	  and	  too	  much	  tolerance?	  It	  requires	  insight	  and	  knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  make	  adequate	  judgements,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  where	  the	  boundary	  lies.	  That	  applies	  at	  the	  formal	  and	  public	  level	  of	  the	  constitution,	  but	  also	  on	  an	  everyday	  and	  personal	  level.	  One	  of	  my	  five	  daughters	  once	  had	  a	  
bad	  boyfriend:	  selfish,	  stubborn,	  narrow-­‐minded.	  She	  had	  taken	  pity	  on	  the	  boy:	  she	  thought	  he	  would	  adapt,	  would	  allow	  himself	  to	  be	  re-­‐educated.	  Therefore,	  she	  tolerated	  some	  of	  his	  bad	  ways,	  to	  maintain	  his	  loyalty	  and	  trust	  (repressive	  tolerance).	  But	  she	  had	  to	  constantly	  remain	  alert	  to	  the	  critical	  boundary.	  His	  selfishness,	  stubbornness	  and	  narrow-­‐mindedness	  obviously	  might	  also	  turn	  against	  her.	  Determining	  such	  limits	  and	  guarding	  them	  requires	  insight	  and	  knowledge.	  In	  morally	  motivated	  toleration	  the	  knowledge	  dimension	  is	  at	  least	  as	  important.	  For	  instance	  toleration	  prompted	  by	  benevolence.	  We	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  pain	  and	  risks	  involved	  in	  the	  circumcision	  of	  boys,	  but	  we	  tolerate	  the	  practice	  because	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  essential	  importance	  to	  Jews	  and	  Muslims.	  This	  tolerance	  may	  arise	  from	  love	  towards	  fellow	  men.	  It	  is	  so	  dear	  to	  Jewish	  and	  Muslim	  parents,	  this	  traditional	  ritual,	  and	  it	  is	  so	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  their	  love	  of	  their	  
children,	  that	  our	  tolerance	  comes	  easy,	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  benevolence.	  But	  we	  do	  not	  show	  the	  same	  tolerance	  towards	  girls’	  circumcision.	  Why	  not?	  Because	  we	  know	  the	  pain	  and	  risks	  and	  consequences	  of	  girls’	  circumcision	  are	  graver	  than	  those	  of	  boys	  circumcision.	  We	  adapt	  our	  tolerance	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  boys’	  circumcision	  and	  girls’	  circumcision.	  Tolerance	  obviously	  requires	  insight	  and	  knowledge.	  Once	  again,	  this	  does	  not	  only	  apply	  at	  the	  level	  of	  legislation	  and	  public	  morals,	  but	  also	  on	  an	  everyday	  personal	  level.	  When	  she	  was	  fifteen,	  another	  one	  of	  my	  daughters	  had	  a	  best	  friend,	  a	  teenage	  girl	  like	  herself,	  who	  had	  peculiar	  ideas	  regarding	  physical	  beauty:	  girls	  ought	  to	  be	  super	  slim.	  My	  daughter	  tolerated	  the	  extreme	  opinion	  and	  also	  the	  associated	  behaviour,	  because	  her	  friend	  was	  dear	  to	  her:	  it’s	  her	  ideal,	  her	  life	  and	  her	  body,	  so	  my	  daughter	  thought;	  it’s	  up	  to	  her.	  However,	  this	  tolerance	  based	  on	  benevolence	  started	  to	  get	  risky	  when	  the	  friend	  began	  to	  exhibit	  anorexia-­‐type	  features.	  Where	  is	  the	  limit	  to	  tolerance	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  benevolence?	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  a	  boundary.	  It	  requires	  knowledge	  and	  insight	  to	  adequately	  determine	  this:	  to	  judge	  when	  and	  when	  not	  tolerance	  is	  appropriate.	  	  Epistemically	  and	  religiously	  motivated	  toleration	  cannot	  do	  without	  knowledge	  either.	  An	  example:	  Orthodox	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  have	  something	  against	  blood	  transfusion.	  This	  sometimes	  causes	  problems	  for	  doctors,	  nurses	  and	  other	  medical	  professionals.	  When	  such	  a	  Jehovah’s	  Witness	  needs	  a	  blood	  transfusion,	  should	  his	  beliefs	  be	  respected	  and	  hence	  his	  refusal	  tolerated?	  When	  the	  person	  in	  question	  is	  an	  adult,	  things	  are	  diffeicult	  enough,	  but	  relatively	  simple:	  it	  is	  his	  belief,	  his	  truth,	  his	  body,	  his	  life.	  So	  leave	  him	  be.	  When	  it	  is	  a	  young	  child,	  it	  is	  also	  relatively	  clear-­‐cut:	  the	  parents	  can	  protest	  until	  they	  drop,	  but	  it’s	  their	  faith,	  not	  necessarily	  that	  of	  their	  children.	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  situation	  parents	  are	  over-­‐ruled.	  Things	  get	  trickier	  in	  the	  case	  of	  young	  people	  from	  the	  ages	  of	  eleven	  or	  twelve	  onwards.	  If	  they	  refuse	  a	  blood	  transfusion	  themselves,	  based	  on	  their	  faith	  …	  Must	  we,	  may	  we	  tolerate	  this?	  
The	  key	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  indeed	  their	  own	  belief.	  Whether	  the	  belief	  is	  authentic.	  It	  requires	  knowledge	  to	  determine	  this.	  All	  kinds	  of	  knowledge:	  in	  any	  case	  biographical	  and	  psychological	  knowledge.	  In	  the	  Netherlands	  this	  matter	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  complex	  legal	  battle.	  Last	  year,	  the	  highest	  court	  judge	  had	  to	  address	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witness’	  faith	  of	  a	  fourteen	  year-­‐old	  boy	  is	  truly	  his	  own	  faith.	  	  It	  reminds	  me,	  by	  the	  way,	  of	  the	  debate	  in	  Germany	  about	  Muslim	  refugees	  who	  convert	  to	  Protestantism.	  Such	  conversions	  may,	  of	  course,	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  genuine	  change	  of	  faith.	  But	  they	  can	  also	  be	  pragmatically	  motivated.	  Conversion	  has	  a	  favourable	  effect	  on	  the	  asylum	  application.	  The	  persecution	  of	  converts	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin,	  means	  that	  they	  will	  more	  easily	  receive	  asylum	  in	  Germany.	  How	  is	  one	  to	  establish	  whether	  a	  refugee	  has	  really	  changed	  his	  religion,	  whether	  his	  conversion	  is	  sincere?	  	  Transposed	  to	  less	  dramatic	  issues	  in	  child-­‐raising,	  education	  and	  youth	  care:	  What	  are	  we	  to	  do	  with	  children	  who	  don’t	  see	  their	  own	  ADHD	  as	  problem	  behavior	  and	  don’t	  want	  to	  take	  Ritalin.	  Is	  it	  their	  sincere	  conviction?	  Does	  it	  deserve	  respect?	  How	  do	  we	  determine	  such	  things?	  And	  what	  are	  we	  to	  do	  with	  children	  who	  refuse	  to	  see	  their	  autism	  as	  a	  disorder,	  but	  understand	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  neurodiversity	  and	  therefore	  see	  no	  need	  for	  treatment?	  Is	  that	  their	  sincere	  conviction?	  Is	  it	  deserving	  of	  respect?	  How	  do	  we	  determine	  such	  things?	  And	  what	  about	  children	  who	  don’t	  believe	  their	  deafness	  is	  a	  handicap,	  but	  understand	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  (deaf	  people	  as	  a	  linguistic	  minority:	  sign	  language-­‐speaking)	  and	  hence	  have	  no	  wish	  to	  be	  taught	  lip	  reading?	  Is	  that	  their	  sincere	  conviction?	  Is	  it	  deserving	  of	  respect?	  How	  are	  we	  to	  determine	  this?	  All	  these	  cases	  and	  problems	  show	  once	  again	  that	  it	  requires	  knowledge	  and	  insight	  to	  adequately	  determine	  judge	  when	  and	  when	  not	  tolerance	  is	  appropriate.	  	  	  
Tolerance	  has	  a	  knowledge	  dimension.	  The	  dispositional	  and	  emotional	  dimension	  is	  strongly	  determined	  by	  genetic,	  familial	  and	  contextual	  factors.	  It	  is	  unclear	  what	  education	  might	  contribute	  to	  this.	  Education	  can	  definitely	  contribute	  to	  the	  knowledge	  dimension.	  	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  for	  promoting	  tolerance	  in	  education?	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  questions	  in	  our	  research	  on	  citizenship	  education.	  But	  it	  seems	  obvious	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  promoting	  tolerance	  asks	  more	  than	  a	  specific	  school	  culture,	  school	  climate	  and	  compostion	  of	  student	  population,	  and	  also	  more	  than	  certain	  manners	  of	  classroom	  management,	  certain	  didactics	  and	  the	  like.	  Knowledge	  is	  an	  important	  dimension.	  So	  we	  have	  to	  look	  at	  curriculum	  and	  subject	  matter.	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